Contention and Conflict in History Writing: Assertion of Social Identities in Historiography of South Asia
The historiography of South Asia has been profoundly shaped by Western rationalist-modernist discourses, which privileged certain narratives while marginalizing others. Colonial, nationalist, and postcolonial schools of historical interpretation have played a crucial role in diversifying perspectives, yet each has been influenced by its own ideological biases. The colonial school, rooted in European preconceptions about the Orient, constructed stereotypes that reinforced imperial dominance (Thapar 2000). Nationalist historiography, emerging in response to colonial narratives, sought to reclaim India’s past but often relied on mythologized constructions, such as the Aryan invasion theory[1] and the golden age of Hindu civilization. Postcolonial approaches, particularly Marxist and Subaltern historiography, attempted to challenge elite-centric narratives by emphasizing class struggle and the agency of marginalized groups. However, these perspectives, too, had limitations—especially in their treatment of religion and everyday lived experiences. This essay critically examines the evolution of South Asian historiography, highlighting the contestations over representation, the ideological underpinnings of historical narratives, and the ongoing challenge of writing an inclusive history that accounts for both elite and subaltern voices.
The colonial school of historiography, which emerged during
British rule, was deeply influenced by European preconceptions about the
Orient. It constructed stereotypes that shaped the Western understanding of
Indian society, often portraying it as stagnant, irrational, and despotic. This
school was further divided into two sub-schools: the Orientalist and the
Utilitarian. Orientalist historiography, exemplified by scholars like Max
Müller, emphasized linguistic and cultural similarities between Europe and India
but also reinforced the notion of a civilizational hierarchy. Utilitarian
historiography, on the other hand, promoted the idea that British rule was
necessary to "civilize" India by introducing rational governance and
legal institutions. These colonial narratives set the foundation for later
historiographical debates, as they not only influenced British policies but
also shaped the responses of Indian nationalist historians.
The nationalist school of historiography emerged in the late
19th century as a response to colonial narratives and played a crucial role in
shaping anti-colonial movements. While it sought to counter colonial
interpretations, it often relied on the Aryan invasion theory and the idea of a
‘golden age’ of Hindu civilization to construct an alternative historical
imagination. The further removed this golden past was from the present, the
more it became a subject of idealized reconstruction, often lacking substantial
historical evidence. Despite rejecting the colonial notion of ‘oriental
despotism,’[2]
nationalist historians largely accepted the factual framework provided by
imperialist scholars. This school also contributed to the rise of religious
nationalism by framing Indian history through Hindu and Muslim civilizational
categories, thereby reinforcing communal identities.
In the postcolonial period, historiography witnessed a shift
with the emergence of two major schools—the Marxist and the Subaltern schools.
The Marxist approach focused on class structures, modes of production, and
economic forces shaping Indian history, critiquing both colonial and
nationalist narratives for their elite-centric perspectives. However, it
struggled to account for the role of religion in India’s socio-political life,
often treating it as a secondary or false consciousness. The
The Subaltern School of historiography emerged as a critical
response to the dominant narratives shaped by colonial, nationalist, and
Marxist historiographies. It challenged the elite-centric perspectives that had
long defined the writing of Indian history, particularly the representation of
peasant and tribal struggles. Colonial and nationalist historians often
depicted peasant uprisings as disorganized, irrational, or spontaneous,
attributing historical change primarily to elite figures and institutions. The
Subaltern School, led by scholars like Ranajit Guha, contested this
"blinkered historiography" and argued that Indian nationalism had
been shaped by both "colonialist elitism and bourgeois elitist
nationalism" (Guha 2010: 1-3). They emphasized the agency of subaltern
groups—peasants, workers, and marginalized communities—who resisted oppression
through their own autonomous actions rather than merely following elite
leadership.
Additionally, the Marxist approach to Indian history,
despite its emphasis on class struggle and material conditions, failed to
adequately account for the role of religion in India's social and political
life. Scholars like Dipesh Chakrabarty (1995: 753) pointed out that the Marxist
historiographical framework, rooted in a strict rationalist-materialist
approach, struggled to explain how religious identities and practices continued
to shape historical processes. The rigid dichotomy between "emotion"
and "reason" led to an overemphasis on economic structures while
neglecting cultural and ideological dimensions of historical change. Similarly,
colonial historiography created an intellectual environment where missionaries,
such as Alexander Duff, advocated for the removal of religious elements from
Indian society in favor of rationalist thought. However, they failed to
recognize that religion and so-called superstition were deeply embedded in
everyday life and were not perceived as sources of embarrassment by Indians. As
a result, both Marxist and colonial historiographies remained unable to fully
capture the complexities of lived experiences, particularly the struggles of
subaltern groups in their everyday resistance and negotiations with power.
The question of religion as a political structure and its
role in shaping modern political discourse has been a critical point of debate
in historiography. Dipesh Chakrabarty (1995) highlights that Sumit Sarkar, in
his study of the Swadeshi movement, did not sufficiently consider whether
religious sensibilities could serve as both political structures and
vocabularies with inherently religious ends. From the early nineteenth century,
religious discourse entered the public sphere through organizations such as the
Atmiya Sabha and Dharma Sabha, eventually influencing movements like Swadeshi.
However, the broader role of religion in politics remained largely unexamined
due to the dominant conception of modernity adopted by intellectuals. The Left
Book Club’s Modern Age and India (1950) reinforced this Eurocentric
model of modernity, arguing that secularism and rationalism were universal
developments emerging from European history (Bhattacharya 1950: 242-243;
Chakravarty 1950: 13). This perspective framed modernity as an emancipatory
force that rejected superstition and dogma in favor of scientific knowledge
(Sen 1950: 1). As a result, modern historiography often overlooked the complex
intersections between religion, social identity, and political mobilization.
While Marxist historiography downplayed religious ideals,
nationalist historians utilized them extensively, albeit in selective and often
distorted forms. Nationalist narratives glorified ancient and medieval Hindu
rulers, emphasizing a "golden past" while incorporating accounts of
Muslims who had served Hindu rulers, such as in the Maratha army. This
historiographical approach not only reinforced Hindu civilizational pride but
also provided a foundation for religious organizations to advance their
agendas. The Arya Samaj movement, led by Swami Dayanand Saraswati, exemplified
this trend by advocating a return to Vedic traditions. Its Shuddhi
(purification) movement contributed to communal tensions in regions like Punjab
in the early twentieth century (Jones 1968). The selective representation of
religious history led to the communalization of historical narratives, shaping
sectarian identities and influencing political movements. However, these
histories were often drafted in a way that appeared inclusive, incorporating
various social classes and communities while still advancing a particular
ideological standpoint.
The institutionalization of history further reinforced the
exclusion of certain groups, contributing to the shaping of dominant national
identities. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the historiographical construction of
Sinhalese identity played a significant role in state formation. The
mythological origins of the Sinhala people and the historical narratives
surrounding Anuradhapura were instrumental in creating a unified national
identity, even as Sri Lankan society remained divided along caste, class, and
clan lines. The state’s propagation of a singular Sinhalese identity, despite
its historical complexities, exemplifies how historiography can be employed as
a tool for social and political polarisation (Gunawardane 1990). This process
underscores the broader tendency within nationalist historiographies to
construct and reinforce dominant social identities while marginalizing
alternative narratives.
The role of historiography in shaping national identities
and political conflicts is evident across South Asia, particularly in Sri
Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Nepal. In Sri Lanka, the construction of Sinhalese
identity played a crucial role in state ideology and group consciousness. As
Gunawardane (1990) observes, the notion of Sinhala identity evolved over time,
incorporating religious and racial elements that shaped social divisions. While
early texts such as Dipavamsa, Mahavamsa, and Samantapasadika
referred to Sinhala in terms of land and language, later historiography
solidified it as an exclusive racial and ethnic category. The
eighteenth-century Sri Lankan historians attempted to unify various social
groups under a singular Sinhala identity, regardless of linguistic or physical
diversity. This historical reconstruction paralleled the concept of ‘race’ in
European and American history, positioning the Sinhalese as the original rulers
and relegating Tamils to the status of migrants. Gunawardane critiques this
process by examining how historicism, as described by Jean Paul-Nancy, assumes
that history is predetermined rather than critically examined. Similarly, David
Scott (1999) emphasizes that history should not be seen as self-evident but as
a subject requiring critical thought. This approach influenced the emergence of
subaltern historiography in South Asia, which sought to challenge dominant
narratives and highlight the voices of marginalized groups.
When history is stripped of critical discourse and used as a
tool for political mobilization, it fosters exclusionary identities and
conflict. The construction of the ‘other’ in nationalist historiography has had
profound consequences. In India, nationalist historians framed Muslims as the
‘other,’ contributing to the development of the Two-Nation Theory and
ultimately the partition of the subcontinent. The Aligarh Movement,[3] initiated by Sir Syed Ahmad
Khan, played a role in shaping Muslim identity within this nationalist
discourse. Pakistan’s historiography, in turn, justified the partition by
portraying it as an inevitable outcome of historical divisions. Ayesha Jalal
(1995: 16) critiques how such historiography blurs the line between creative
imagination and historical fact, arguing that when all interpretations are
treated as equally valid, it opens the door for identity politics to foster
hatred towards internal and external ‘others’ (Jalal 1996: 16). Similar
patterns are visible in Sri Lanka, where historical constructions of Sinhala
and Tamil identities fueled civil conflict, and in Nepal, where
historiographical discrimination has influenced the federal constitution debate
between Tarai and Parbat regions. Historiography, when manipulated to serve
ideological purposes, not only distorts historical realities but also
perpetuates long-standing social and political conflicts.
Social identity in historiography, as reflected in these explanations, gives rise to diverse interpretations. However, different groups also construct their own histories, often glorifying their social identities, which contributes to the emergence of communalism. In the case of India, there is no fundamental distinction between majority (Hindu) communalism and minority (Muslim, Sikh, Christian) communalism, as both are variants of the same ideological framework and equally dangerous (Chandra 2008: 608). However, while minority communalism can lead to separatist movements, such as the Partition of India or the Khalistan movement, majority communalism has the potential to take a fascist turn. Within a democratic framework, it becomes easier for the majority community to leverage state power to disseminate particular historical narratives through state textbooks. The state's appropriation and presentation of social identities in a selective manner often fuels conflicts among different communities.
Rammanohar Lohia, in History Writing, critiques
Indian historiography for distorting historical consciousness. He argues that
Indian history has been presented in such a way that “most Indians do not
today know the difference between shame and glory” (Lohia 2011: 464). The
framing of conquests and defeats often serves ideological ends. Mughal
historians downplayed Afghan rulers, while British historians glorified Rajputs
and Afghans while undermining the Mughals. Hannah Arendt (1961) distinguishes between
history as action and fabrication, with the latter shaping a
coherent but selective narrative. Many historians, driven by nostalgia,
fabricate history to fit present ideological needs.
However, intellectuals have sought to challenge the
misrepresentation and erasure of marginalized communities. Dalits, historically
depicted as passive victims, have developed their own historiographical
discourse. Dalit scholars such as Kancha Ilaiah, Gopal Guru, and Omprakash
Valmiki have foregrounded Dalit experiences and epistemic violence. Valmiki’s Joothan
captures the lived experiences of Dalits and their struggle for emancipation.
Similarly, the Subaltern Studies collective critiques the rationalist model of
history writing, arguing that it systematically neglected caste, religion, and
other axes of marginalization.
In conclusion, the representation of social identity in historiography is not merely a matter of historical inquiry but a deeply political act that shapes group consciousness, national identity, and social conflicts. From colonial historiography’s stereotypical portrayals to nationalist and Marxist interpretations, history writing has played a crucial role in defining communities and legitimizing political structures. The selective emphasis on certain narratives while marginalizing others has contributed to communal divisions, as seen in the two-nation theory, the communalization of India's freedom struggle, and the historiographical constructions of modern nation-states. However, critical interventions—such as subaltern studies and Dalit historiography—have sought to challenge these dominant frameworks by recovering the voices of marginalized groups. Ultimately, history is not a fixed account of the past but a dynamic and contested space where identities are continuously constructed and reinterpreted, often in service of contemporary political and ideological needs.
[1]
According to this account, India was invaded and conquered by nomadic,
light-skinned Indo-European tribes from Central Asia between 1500 and 100 BC.
These tribes are believed to have overthrown an earlier, more advanced,
dark-skinned Dravidian civilization, from which they adopted many elements that
later became part of Hindu culture. This so-called pre-Aryan civilization is
said to be evidenced by the large urban ruins of the "Indus Valley
Civilization," named after the Indus River, where many of its initial
sites were discovered.
[2] Colonial discourse propagated the idea that colonized are not civilised to rule. Therefore, it is not in the interest of colonizers that they rule over India rather it is the colonizers duty to make colonized able to rule.
[3]
After the Revolt of 1857, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan initiated the Aligarh Movement to
foster better relations between Muslims and the British. The establishment of
Aligarh Muslim University was a key part of this movement.
[4] In 2002, the Indian state of Gujarat witnessed a series of communal riots between Hindus and Muslims. The violence erupted following the burning of a train in Godhra, in which 70 people lost their lives.
[5]
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is a Hindu nationalist organization in
India.
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